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Who Pays for Progress? Accident Law in
Florida, 1845-1886
by James L. Hunt

F

ew residents of twentyfirstcentury Florida are unfamiliar
with the notion of legal liability for accidental injuries. The
image of the "ambulance chasing" attorney, the call for 'tort
reform," and a recurring medical malpractice insurance 'crisis"
are well-known to the casual observer of affairs. In fact, much of
the modern business of Florida trial courts concerns automobile
accidents, injuries from products, and professional malpractice.
In 2000-2001, approximately 35,000 such cases were filed in the
state's circuit courts, roughly 23 percent of all civil cases. About
2,000 involved professional malpractice, 4,600 products liability,
and 17,000 automobile accidents.' Despite its current prominence, legal responsibility for accidental injury to persons or prop
erty is not a new phenomenon. Since 1845, individuals,
companies, and the state have been confronted with the need to
create and implement rules that address accidentally caused

James L. Hunt is Associate Professor of Law in the Eugene W. Stetson School of
Business and Economics and the Walter F. George School of Law at Mercer
University in Macon, Ga.
1. These numbers are significant, but they constitute only a small part of the
caseload in Florida trial courts, which amounted to almost 2.8 million civil
and criminal filings in 2000-2001. Even within the subcategory of civil cases
in the circuit courts, most were disputes over contracts, not accidental injury.
Criminal,juvenile, and domestic cases (divorce and child custody, e.g.) are of
much greater numerical importance in modem Florida than accident cases.
Florida Office of State Courts Administration, Statistical Refmme Guide:
fida's Trial C O U ~20002001
S,
(Tallahassee,Fla., 2002), sec.1: 2, 5; sec. 5: 1,
3,9, 10.
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death, maiming, and property damage. The persistent question
has been, "Who should pay for unintended injuries to persons and
property?"
One answer has been the legal doctrine of negligence. In general, negligence rules are not complex. Liability based on negligence is determined by whether the person's action or inaction
was "unreasonablenor lacking in "ordinary care" under the circumstances. In order to recover damages, an injured person must
also show that there was a sufficient causal connection between the
unreasonable action and any injury. Under the rule of "contributory negligence," the injurer's responsibility might be diminished
or even eliminated if the injured person acted unreasonably.
Although the legal principles are straightforward, their application
to real disputes has often raised difficult problems. During the
past 150 years, lawyers and judges have written volumes about the
meaning of "negligence" in specific contexts. Predictably, given
the uniqueness of each accident and the economic costs at stake,
judges, legislatures, and juries have expressed contrasting views
about who should bear the costs of injurie~.~
The law of accidents and its history should not concern only
judges, juries, lawyers, legal scholars, or the injured. Historians of
all kinds can learn a great deal about the priorities of government
and the patterns of shifting social and economic relations: how a
society defines and treats victims of harm and the persons who
cause harm is an important measure of its social, economic, and
political values. Florida historians, however, have not fully integrated this story into the state's past. As a result, this article seeks
to shed light on life and law in nineteenthcentury Florida by
describing the state's experience with accidental injuries between
1845 and 1886. It explores the decisions of Florida's Supreme
Court, accident cases in several of the state's trial courts, and the
actions of the state legislature. The special characteristics of nineteenth-century Florida provide unique grounds on which to use
legal history to evaluate political, social, and economic conditions
in the early history of the state?
2.

3.

On the essential elements of negligence, see Dan D. Dobbs, The Law of Torts
(St. Paul, Minn., 2000), 269-73.
Florida legal history is fortunate in that several fine studies address its state
and federal courts. See Walter W. Manley 11, E. Canter Brown, and Eric W.
Rise, The Supem Court of Floride and its Re&cessor Courts, 1821-1917
(Gainesville,Fla., 1997); Kermit L. Hall and Eric W. Rise, F m Local COWLSto
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No legal system develops in a social and economic vacuum,
and Florida's has been no exception. A critical early influence was
the low degree of urbanization, mechanized transportation, and
industry. Although permanent European settlement began in the
1560s, for the next three hundred years immigration was slow and
largely restricted to the peninsula's northern half. When admitted to the Union in 1845, there were no towns of any size.
Jacksonville containedjust over 1,000 souls in 1850, while Key West
counted less than 3,000. Nonetheless, the rate of growth in the fifteen years before and after statehood was substantial. The population grew from 34,000 in 1830 to about 140,000 in 1860. The
state's first economy was almost entirely agricultural, with black
slavery and livestock particularly important. Manufacturing fared
poorly, and compared to other southern states, railroad develop
ment progressed at a snail's pace. This economic background is
critical to understanding accident law. Outside Florida, industrial
development, including railroads, was the most consistent source
of accidental injury to persons and property. Steam power, despite
its great benefits, caused death, personal injury, and property damage. Yet, little railroad mileage was constructed in Florida before
1860, and much of it covered only short distances. River, ocean,
and gulf tdlic, some of it steamdriven, remained the primary

National Tribunals: The Federal District Courts of Hmida, 1821-1990 (Brooklyn,
N.Y., 1991);James M. Denharn, "A Rouge's Paradise": Crime and Punishment in
Antebellum M d a (Tuscaloosa,Ala., 1997). A broad discussion of accident law
is beyond the scope of any of these books, however; see for example, Manley
et al., S u p Court of f i d a , 18081; Hall and Rise, From Local Courts to
National T h n a l s , 47. Two other studies that address relevant topics in
Florida's legal history are James M. Denham, "From a Territorial to a State
Judiciary: Florida's Antebellum Courts and Judges," JMda Historical Quartdy
73 (April 1995): 443-55; Robert B. Lewis, "Railroad Cases in the Florida
Supreme Court, 18451887," M d a Supreme Court Historical Society RRliew 1
(winter 1985): 3-5, 10-12. The nature and purpose of accident law has generated considerable heat and light among legal historians, but unfortunately
little of this learning has been incorporated into the dialogues of American
historians outside that specialty. Some of the contourn of this debate can be
gleaned from Lawrence M. Friedman and Thomas D. Russell, "More Civil
Wrongs: Personal Injury Litigation, 1901-1910," Amnican Journal of Legal
History 34 (July 1990): 296-414; Morton Horwitz, Th.e T r a m f m t i o n of
American Law, 1 7801860 (New York, 1977), 8599; Gary T. Schwartz, "Tort
Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America," Yale Law Journal 90
(July 1981): 1717-75; John F. Witt, "Toward a New History of American
Accident Law: Classical Tort Law and the Cooperative First Party Insurance
Movement," Haruard Law Rariew 14 (January 2001) : 690841.
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means of longdistance transportation. Altogether, slavery, the
dominance of agriculture, the lack of urban areas, and the persistence of a water-based transportation system shaped the state's earliest experiences with accidental i n j ~ r i e s . ~
Between 1845 and 1865, the clearest legal effect of Florida's
undeveloped economy was that the use of negligence law concepts
was infrequent, both in the state's trial courts and in the Florida
Supreme Court. A review of circuit court minute books and other
trial court records from Escambia, Marion, Leon, Gadsden,
Madison, and Hillsborough Counties during the first two decades
of statehood reveals few cases that might have been based on accidental harm. All of these counties maintained "minute books" of
the circuit courts, which listed the names of cases and any disposition by the court. They also signified the type of case by noting the
technical name for its pleading, the form in which the dispute was
presented to the court. The typical form of pleading for an accident case in antebellum Florida was "trespass on the case."
Unfortunately, the "trespass on the case" pleading was sometimes
used in cases involving facts other than accidents. Still, it was
apparent from the minute books that all uses of "trespass on the
case" were rare, suggesting claims based on negligence were infrequent. They were certainly insignificant compared to the flood of
criminal prosecutions and disputes over debt that dominated
Florida's circuit courts. Civil disputes in Florida usually involved
breaches of contract and competing claims to property ow~lership.
The new railroad companies occasionally appeared as participants
in cases, but generally as debtors or creditor^.^
4.

5.

The frontier nature of pre-Civil War Florida is surveyed in Michael Gannon,
ed., The New Histmy of Florida (Gainesville, Fla., 1996), 40-230; Charlton W.
Tebeau, A Histmy o f F b d u (CoralGables, Fla., 1971), 133-98. On the limitations of early Florida railroads, see Gregg Turner, A Short History of W
Railroads (Charleston, S.C., 2003), 12-32; George W. PettengillJr., The Story of
the Fbrida Railroads, 18341W3 (Boston, 1952), 10-28.
An impediment to trial-level research is that nineteenth~enturycourt records
are stored by county clerks rather than at the state archives, producing widely varying circumstances of maintenance and access. Altogether, I contacted
clerk's offices in Escambia (Pensacola), Franklin (Apalachicola), Gadsden
(Quincy), Leon (Tallahassee),Jefferson (Monticello), Madison (Madion),
Columbia (Lake City), Alachua (Gainesville), Duval Uacksonville), St. Johns
(St. Augustine), Marion (Ocala), Hillsborough (Tampa), and Monroe (Key
West) Counties about nineteenthcentury trial court records. Several offices,
including those in Duval, Columbia, and Franklin, reported that their records
for the years before 1880 had been destroyed. Others had real difficulty
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Despite the infrequency of accident claims, surviving case
files in Escambia and Marion Counties indicate that antebellum
Florida lawyers were well aware of the negligence concept. In
Goodman v. Ramsey, an 1851 Pensacola case, the plaintiff claimed
he lost $600 worth of lumber when the defendants "negligently,
carelessly, and improperly conducted themselves." In Shield v.
Pendleton, heard in 1859 also in Pensacola, the plaintiff sought
damages for hides lost in a wrecked ship. Another shipping case
was Howard v. McGahagan, decided in Marion Countyjust before
the Civil War. There the defendant warehouse owner, according to Howard, "carelessly and negligently conducted themselves" so as to destroy $1,200 worth of cotton. Importantly, all
of these cases involved losses in commercial contexts, specifically in the transportation of goods-lumber, hides, and cottonto market.6
Naturally, the lack of accident litigation extended to the
antebellum supreme court, which depended on the trial courts
for its business. During the 1840s and 1850s, there was not a single reported appeal in Florida involving a negligently caused
injury among persons or companies lacking a prior business relationship. Nor were there any personal injury cases, including
employee injury cases. There were not any appeals involving
damage to either livestock-a critical part of the Florida economy-or to persons resulting from railroad collisions. Moreover,
the Florida Supreme Court did not address in any depth the
standard of liability for freight carriers, a hot and common dis-

6.

identifying what they might have. A few counties, including Escambia and
Marion, have preserved both minute books and a significant number of original case files with pleadings and evidence. Alachua County has placed a
huge variety of its records on the clerk's web page, making them available
around the globe; see http://www.clerk-alachua-fl.org/clerk. I also consulted copies of Justice Court (a small claims court) documents for Hillsborough
County (1850.1885) in the Special Collections Department at the University
of South Florida Library, Tampa. For a good discussion of antebellum trial
courts and their records, see Denham, A Rogue's Paradise, 2458, 212-13, 3 3 9
41. A succinct presentation of the highly technical question of "trespassnand
nineteenthcentury pleading in accident cases is Dobbs, The Law of Torts, 225
27, 259-63.
Goodman v. Ramsqr, file no. 2054, and Shield v. Pendleton, file no. 3515, both in
Escambia County Clerk's Office, Pensacola, Fla.; Howard v. McCuhagan, file
no. 1657, and Haward v. McCahagan, Marion County Circuit Court Minutes, 1
May 1860, both in Marion County Clerk's Office, Ocala, Fla.
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pute in neighboring states. As a result, the rural and agricultural condition of the state delayed the full development of negligence law before 1865.'
Nonetheless, the antebellum supreme court did consider a
few cases involving accidental injury. In fact, its earliest confrontations with liability for accidents provide strong evidence of
how American law drifted across state borders. One subtle influence was the fact that Florida in the 1840s and 1850s was a state
of immigrants, a condition that of course applied to its judges.
The forces propelling the importation of law were so strong that
they occurred despite limited printed resources. In the 1850s,
the supreme court confessed, "Unfortunately, we have no
[access] to [law] books, and particularly those bearing most
directly on the points [at issue], and are confined, in some
The "Catalogue of Booksnin the state's judidegree, to dige~ts."~
cial library reflected the primitive state of Florida's law libraries
at late as 1861. The court possessed incomplete reports, digests,
and statutes from other states, some federal reports and statutes,
and a few treatises, altogether less than a few hundred volumes.
Given that the state library was probably the best law library in
Florida, it is not surprising that many of the court's early opinions dealing with accidental injury relied on presumed general
principles of law.9
The antebellum supreme court considered accidental
injuries in several contexts. Its first cases arose out of situations
involving special agreements or public duties. The small number of these appeals addressed the obligations of attorneys,10

7.

In BarzGtt v. Filyaw, 1 Fla. 403 (1847), an early decision involving the loss of
three boxes of tobacco on a steamboat, the supreme court defined common
carriers to include steamboats and certain ferries for hire. The court held, in
upholding liability against a steamboat owner, that the burden was on him to
demonstrate that "in virtue of some special public notice, or other good legal
ground" that he was not liable as a common carrier. The rule governing the
liability of carriers was liability without negligence, or fault, the traditional
common law doctrine. The lost tobacco was carried on the Appalachicola
River to Appalachicola in December 1842.
8. Kclly v. W a k 6 Fla. 690,707 (1856).
9. Supplement, 10 Ha. at I-VIII.
10. Hale v. C m U S Admr., 2 Fla. 534 (1849), a curious Leon County case involving a disputed contract, addressed the "negligence" of an attorney who
obtained a default judgment which was actually to the disadvantage of his
clients. The court allowed the default to be reversed. Watcl-sonv. Seat and
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cities," and parties in bailments,12 with the last, as in other
southern states, primarily involving injuries to hired slaves.
Slave hire accidents were the most frequent disputes involving
accidental injury considered by the Florida Supreme Court. The
legal rules governing the slave cases were similar to those adopted
in other southern jurisdictions. For example, in an appeal involving a slave, Esop, who died while hired to lay track for the
Pensacola and Georgia Rail-Road in Leon County, the justices
announced that "Courts of the Southern States, in adjudicating
the question as to what shall constitute negligence in the bailee of
a slave, have justly and humanely defined the rule to be any failure

Crawford, 10 Fla. 326 (1864), a dispute over ownership of lumber in
Hillsborough County, provided that the "negligence" of an attorney could be
the basis of an action for damages by the attorney's client.
11. TaUahassee v. Fortune, 3 Fla. 19 (1850), a case in which a city was successfully
sued for property damage, involved a gully in a public road that caused the
death of the plaintiffs horse. The plaintiff tied the horse in front of his tin
shop in the town, but the horse got loose, was injured, and died. The case file
reveals that the plaintiff sought $200 for "trespass on the case," alleging that
the city was 'in no wise ignorant of the premises, but [was] unmindful of its
duty in this behalf" by not filling the ditch. The city responded that as a
municipal corporation it could not be liable for trespass and that the plaintiff
had negligently tied the horse. The "contributory negligence" of the plain=-his
failure to act with "ordinary care"-the city suggested, should bar any
recovely. The supreme court, however, held that the gully was a nuisance,
that under its charter Tallahassee had the power to remove nuisances, and
that it was therefore obligated to remove nuisances and would be liable to the
plaintiff unless the injury to the horse occurred by the plaintiffs own gross
negligence, which was defined as an absence of "ordinary care." The court
found the plaintiff was not negligent because hones often escaped from their
hitchings, and this horse was likely trying to get back to its stall. A trial judgment against the defendant city was affirmed; Tallahassee v. Fortune, Florida
Supreme Court Folder 0854, Florida State Archives, Tallahassee.
12. A bailment is the delivery of personal property to a person (the bailee) in
trust to be used by the bailee for some particular purpose and then returned.
This was the legal arrangement for the hiring of slaves, who were considered
personal property. In F w o n v. Pmter,3 Fla. 27,3839 (1850), the court held
that a bailee who receives no benefit from a bailment is only liable for "gross
negligence." In contrast, a bailee who benefits from the arrangement, such
as someone who hires a slave, is to act with 'diligence and skill." If the bailee
failed to follow the instructions of the property owner, he was liable for any
injury to the property. F w m involved a business transaction in Monroe
County in which Porter agreed to ship arrowroot to New Orleans but instead
shipped it to Charleston where it was lost. The trial court found in favor of
the defendant, but the supreme court reversed on the ground that the duty
of the defendant was not properly considered. The issue of slave bailments
in law is addressed at length in Thomas D. Morris, S o u t h Shvery and the Law
(Chapel Hill, N.C., 1996), 132-58.
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to bestow that degree of care and attention which a kind and
In
humane master would bestow under the circ~mstances."~~
another dispute, involving the drowning of a hired slave, Peter, at
a lumber mill in Duval County, the court imposed a duty on the
slave hirer to not subject a slave to work for which he was not fit.
Peter was sent into an area of the mill where the water was up to
eight feet deep, but he could not swim. The court affirmed a finding of liability in the trial court.14
The most important case involving the liability of slave hirers
was Fomyth &' Szmpson v. Peny,in which the court refused to apply
13. TaUahassw R R Co. v. Macon, 8 Fla. 299, 304 (1859). Esop was subleased by
the defendant to the Pensacola and Georgia Railroad, apparently a common
practice; Larry E. Rivers, Slavery in Ei!mida (Gainesville, Ha., 2000), 30-32, 8081. The core of the claim was that Esop fell ill, and the railroad failed to provide medical care. The railroad responded that it allowed Esop to stop work
when he did not feel well (he was ramming dirt under new cross-ties), gave
him alcohol, pills, and a visit from a physician. The parties quibbled over
Esop's age, as it naturally affected the damages. Esop's owner claimed he was
between forty and forty-fiveyears of age and valued at $1,500; the railroad said
he was an old man only worth $300. The court afftrmed a verdict for the
p l a i n t .for $600; Tallahassee R R Co. v. Macon, Florida Supreme Court Folder
0853, Florida State Archives. In McRaeny v. Johnson &Moore, 2 Ha. 520, 527
(1849), the court stated, apparently without any sense of irony, "In cases of
injury to this species of property [slaves], the American courts, by a spirit of
enlightened humanity, have extended a more enlarged protection than prevails in cases of mere chattels." Of course, the slave in all of these cases was
either dead or injured, and at any rate could not benefit from any damages
that instead went to owners. In fact, in McRacny, a white man beat the slave
Sam to death. The lawsuit was about who owned Sam and therefore who had
the right to compensation for his death.
14. KeUy v. Wallace, 6 Fla. 690, 704-705. The mill owner beat and otherwise
harassed Peter and routinely sent him to recover logs in deep water although
he knew Peter could not swim. The trialjudge charged thejury that the claim
was based on "negligence and want of ordinary care," and that a key question
was whether the slave received an order that "no ordinary prudent man would
have given"; KeUy v. Wallau, Florida Supreme Court Folder 0776, Florida State
Archives. Another slave bailment case, originally filed in 1860, was Pmacola
13Ceorg~RR v. Nash, 12 Fla. 497 (1869). A slave, Jackson, was hired as a
locomotive fireman. He was ordered tojump from the locomotive and attach
a rope to a moving train as it pulled into Tallahassee from St. Marks. He fell
while getting back on the locomotive, and the engine crushed his foot. After
its amputation,Jackson's leg became infected and he died of "lockjaw." The
slave's owner argued that Jackson was hued only as a fireman and was not
hired for the more dangerous job of coupling and uncoupling cars. The
defendant claimed that it was allJackson's fault. He was not ordered to try to
get back on the moving locomotive. That was his negligent decision and
should bar any recovery. The supreme court accepted the latter argument
and reversed an $1,800jury verdict for the plaintiff; Pmacola and Geu@ RR
Co. v. Nnrh, Florida Supreme Court Folder 0837, Florida State Archives.
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the fellow servant rule. The rule, well established in other states,
provided that a worker could not recover damages if his on-the-job
injury was caused by the negligence of a "fellow servant," or coworker.15 Given that any injury of a worker was Likely to be the
result of errors of "fellow servants," the rule presented a substantial barrier to recovery. In Perry,a slave in Santa Rosa County
drowned while attempting to follow an order to jump to a steamboat from a flatboat. The slave tried but fell into the water and
drowned.16 In his defense, the boat owner argued that the mate,
not the owner, was negligent." The court interpreted this as an
argument that the employer was not responsible for the actions of
his employees, and that workers in general assumed all risks of
injury or death resulting from the negligence of fellow servants.18
Although the court agreed the rule applied to free workers, it
rejected its application to a case involving a slave, reasoning that
" [u]nlike white persons, the slave does not, upon entering into the
service of another, voluntarily incur the risks and dangers incident
to such service."1g Further,
The [fellow servant] rule applies to [free] persons necessarily-those who are competent to contract, and who,
while they are responsible for the consequences of their
own misconduct, have the same rights and remedies as
their co-agents. Why [include] slaves, when it is manifest
they have none of those rights or remedies against others,
and are not liable in a civil suit for their own acts and mis
conduct? . . .Apart from the views we have presented, considerations of public policy, the interest of the master, and
humanity to the slave, require that . . . [the slave] should
be shielded from the unrestricted control and oppression
of irresponsible subordinates. The liability of the employer . . . , for the misconduct of his subordinates, will naturally add to the personal security and protection of the
slave.*O
15. F q t h & Simpson v. Peny, 5 Fla. 337 (1853). On slaves as fellow servants, see
Morris, Southern S b q and the Law, 147-58.
16. F q t h & Simpson v. Peny,5 Fla. at 341.
17. Ibid., 5 Fla. at 34142.
18. Ibid., 5 Fla. at 342. The only citation was to Joseph Story's Cmmtaries on the
Law of Agacy (Boston, 1839).
19. F q t h 6' Simpson v. Peny, 5 Ha. at 343.
20. Ibid., 5 Fla. at 34345.
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In the court's mind, it was more "humane" in this context to view
slaves as property than persons.21
Courts were not the only part of Florida's government concerned with accidents. Before the Civil War, the state legislature
passed a number of statutes dealing with the potential for injury.
Most important, in 1859 and 1861, it adopted laws describing what
should happen when railroads killed or injured livestock, suggesting that livestock was already being killed by locomotives. Florida
was a common pasturagejurisdiction; owners of roaming livestock
could let their herds range freely over others' property.
Landowners wishing to keep livestock out of their land had the
legal burden of "fencing out* the animals. Otherwise, they could
not complain about damages caused by foraging livestock.
Showing a desire to protect the free-range property right, the general assembly challenged the use of a negligence standard in this
context. Its statutes provided that railroad companies "shall pay
for all cattle and other live stock killed" regardless of any need to
prove fault by the company. The laws established a process of
informal application to the railroad companies for payment.
Further, engineers and conductors were required to report all livestock injuries to their employers, and the railroads were charged
with keeping public records of all livestock accidents? The
statutes clearly intended to protect the state's livestock interests by
making it easier to impose liability on the new railroads.
Altogether, the infrequent application of accident law in antebellum Florida was caused by a lack of urban, industrial, and transportation development. The economic context of the few decided
cases-lost goods on a steamboat, killed slaves hired out to a lumber mill or a ship owner, Tallahassee's poor streets, and the mistakes of attorneys-suggests the relevance of the urban and
indusmal capacity to kill or to damage property. Yet, there was not
much that was either urban or industrial in early Florida, evidenced especially by the general absence of railroads. Moreover,
the few disputes addressing liability for accidental harm arose out
of existing legal relationships: carriers and shippers, bailors and
bailees, cities and citizens, and attorneys and their clients. All of
the earliest disputes involved iniury to property, often slaves. The

21. Ibid., 5 Fla. at 344.
22. Digtst efthe Statute h w of F b d u (Tallahassee,Fla., 1872), 12527.
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general assembly's interest in accidents was directed to railroads
and livestock. In pre-Civil War Florida, personal injury claims arising out of accidents were simply not a meaningful component of
the state's law.
In this environment both the general assembly and the
supreme court did not mind crafting rules that held injurers of
property liable. In fact, under Florida law livestock killings by railroads and injury to property on common carriers such as steamboats resulted in liability even without the fault of the defendant.
Similarly, the supreme court did not apply the fellow servant rule
to slaves, and towns and attorneys were held liable for their negligence. The willingness to impose responsibility, however, was not
the result of any animus toward modern devices. Florida's legislature actively participated in the development of railroads, and in
1859, the supreme court proclaimed that "Railroads in cities and
towns cannot with propriety be termed nuisances. . . . They are in
use in the principal cities of Europe and this country, and, when
regulated by proper restrictions, are valuable aids to commerce.n23
Instead, accident law in early Florida tried to balance the interests
of old and new forms of property, seeking a middle ground among
slave owners, boat owners, the new railroads, and livestock owners
that held injurers to account in an environment in which personal injury was not a factor and the overall numbers of claims was
small.
The antebellum liability system did not last, however, as economic transformation between 1865 and 1886 changed the meaning of accident law in Florida. Slave hires, which had generated
the most common kind of pre-Civil War accident case, ended with
Emancipation. After a series of setbacks related to railroad line
destruction during the Civil War and financial corruption during
Reconstruction, railroads expanded at an unprecedented pace.
Between 1880 and 1885, railroad mileage increased from less than
500 to more than 1,650. The total was just under 2,500 in 1890.
The number of Floridians also grew, if slowly. In 1880, the state's
population was less than 270,000, one of the lowest in the federal
union. No place had more than 10,000 persons, including
23. Gagm v. F i h , 8 Fla. 325, 332 (1859). For a discussion of state sponsorship of
railroad construction before and after the Civil War and the personal financial interests of supreme court justices in internal improvements, see Lewis,
"RailroadCases in the Florida Supreme Court,"S5, 10.
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Jacksonville, Pensacola, and Key West, the leading towns. Tampa
counted less than 1,000.24Nonetheless, legislators and judges gave
increased attention to the injuries that resulted from improvements in transportation.
As before the Civil War, the supreme court decided several
lawsuits involving goods destroyed while being transported.
Damages to goods shipped on railroads produced appeals for the
first time. One such case, heard in 1872, arose when shoes,
clothes, and furniture shipped from New York to Gainesville were
lost. The court reversed a trial verdict against the Florida Railroad
Company on the ground that the more than $700 awarded was
excessive.25 In another appeal, a dentist's implements valued at
more than $500 were lost on a steamer in the St. Johns River. The
supreme court, however, refused the plaintiff compensation for his
inability to practice dentistry and also denied any special recovery
for the tools, which allegedly were set with gold, diamonds, and
rubies.26 In contrast, in S o u t h E x m s Co. v. Van Meter, the court
held an express company in Alachua County liable for a misdelivered package under the prevailing strict liability standard for common
Altogether, the results in the carrier cases were
primarily determined by the terms of agreement between the ship
per and carrier. The contractual basis of carrier liability law in
Florida, as opposed to negligence, was recognized in an 1885
statute requiring common carriers to deliver freight strictly according to their agreements with the shipper, whether represented by
a bill of lading or some other document.28
A second type of property case, the accidental killing of livestock by railroads, had received the legislature's attention before
the Civil War. After the war, the issue of liability for livestock
killings produced a dramatic and welldefined contest between the
legislature and the supreme court. The conflict was predictable.
Divisions in Florida politics frequently resulted from disagree-

24. Turner, A Short History of Flmida Railmuis, B 9 2 ; Pettengill, The Stmy of the
Hhidu Railroadr, 8; Gannon, ed., Thc New History of FEorida, 249-86. On the
general failure of Florida's railroads to expand between 1865 and 1880, see
Edward C. Williamson, F k d u Politics in the Gilded Age, 1877-1893 (Gainesville,
Fla., 1976), 7-8, 1516,30-31; Manley et al., The Supreme Court of Fhidu, 261.
25. I;lorida RR v. Gensler & S h t e i n , 14 Fla. 122 (1872).
26. B m k v. Gale, 14 Fla. 523 (1874).
27. Southern Express Company v. Van M e ,17 Fla. 783 (1880).
28. Rewised Statutes of the State of l*%orida (Jacksonville,Fla., 1892), s. 2348.
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ments about the legal status of railroads, and competition between
farmers and the railroads in livestock cases was simply part of that
larger contest.29 Property in livestock was often the critical capital
of the yeoman fanner, a class that possessed considerable political
clout in late nineteenth-century Florida. And legally the livestock
owner had long held an established property right in the free
range of his animals. Further, prior to the Civil War, the Florida
legislature endorsed both an abbreviated legal process and railroad liability for livestock killings even without any negligence by
the railroad.
After the Civil War, the growth of railroads produced more
livestock accidents, and for the first time the property rights of the
farmer became subject to evaluation in the supreme court. During
the 1870s, the state's Reconstruction legislature passed a provision
that made it illegal to allow any animals to stray onto railroad
tracks. With Republicans in retreat as Reconstruction ended, a
Consewative-Democratic legislature overturned this potentially
radical pro-railroad change by providing that companies "shall be
held liable" for damages to livestock caused "by the cars or trains
of such company." Proof of damages could be provided by af£idavit of the owner, rearming antebellum principles.30 The legislature also permitted levies on railroad property and
garnishment of railroad depot agents in order to collect damages
for livestock injuries. Still, the legislature repealed former provisions requiring informal claims before instituting a lawsuit in a
court.31
The legislature's preference for railroad liability was not tested
in the supreme court until 1886 with Savannah, Florida and Westem
Ry. Co. v. Ceiger. Florida statutory law provided that railroads "shall
be held liable" for injuries to stock.32 Geiger involved a claim for
damages to livestock in Nassau County for which the plaintiff won
a verdict at trial. Yet, Geiger was not simply a contest over a few ani-

29. According to Edward C. Williamson, arguments over the financial and political power of railroads, especially those controlled by out-of-state interests,
were at the forefront of state politics after 1880;Florida Politics in the Gi&d Age,
14442, 193.
30. Digest the Laws of the State of W d a (Tallahassee, Fla., 1881), 12526, 856;
m Co. v. Geiger, 21 Fla. 669,685-86 (1886).
Savannah, Flarida and W ~ t Ry.
31. D i p t of the Laws of the State of l&ida, 12526,856.
32. Savannah, FEorida and Western Ry. Co., 21 Fla. 669; Digest of the Laws of the State
of W d u , 356.
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mals. It confronted the supreme court with the larger question of
the relative property rights of farmers and industry and who would
be asked to bear the costs of modernization. Few policy questions
in a capitalist economy were more important than the definition of
relative property rights. Farmer Geiger's predicament was
undoubtedly common. Ten of his cattle, two sheep, and five hogs
were killed by the railroad in less than a year. Fed up, he proceeded to court on the evidence of carcasses found alongsidethe
tracks and claimed roughly $150 in damages. His claim relied on
ancient property rights as well as the livestock statute: "The custom of the County is that stock grase [sic] in the woods wherever
they please, and it was the same custom before the [Savannah,
Florida & Western] was built." From the beginning, the key legal
question was the standard of liability. The railroad maintained
that the claim failed because there was no allegation of negligence.
Geiger responded, "[TI here is no law requiring him to set out or
prove negligence." The trial court, following the livestock statute,
agreed with Geiger and instructed the jury that the killings were
p.ima f&
evidence of negligence. The jury awarded Geiger
$146.33
Savannah, Florida & Western Railway appealed to the supreme
court. Robert Davis, a Jacksonville attorney who represented the
railroad, prepared an elaborate six-page printed brief in which he
argued that negligence could not be presumed; it had to be
proven by the plaintiff. He attacked the livestock statute as imposing unfair punishment when there was no evidence of fault. The
statute "attempts to hold all railroad companies in this State liable
for damages to live stock on their roads absolutely, and provides an
ex parte method of proving the amount of the damage by the affidavit of a witness." According to Davis, this violated economic efficiency because "it would be absolutely impossible for the engineers
to run their trains so as to make half the time now universally
required by the traveling public without occasionally killing an animal." He believed the law considered the "efficient operation of
railroads" to be of much more importance "than the avoiding of
injury to live-stock." As a result, locomotives were not required to
slow down when livestock was seen. Economics aside, according to

33. Savannah, P h i & , a d W e s h Ay. Co. v. Geiger, Florida Supreme Court Folder
0808, Florida State Archives.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol82/iss2/3

14

Hunt: Who Pays for Progress? Accident Law in Florida, 1845-1886

Davis, the statute was invalid because of the due process requirements of the federal and Florida constitutions. As a matter of constitutional law, the legislature could not impose liability without
fault. It could not take the property of one person and give it to
another without proof of negligence. Davis conceded that livestock owners would probably not be able to prove negligence very
often, given that all that would be left after a killing would be a rotting carcass. Yet, the "law is the law, work a hardship on whom it
may." Further, because 90 percent of these cases were for small
amounts and brought before justices of the peace, where there
were no written pleadings, the companies were unable to adequately defend claims under the current standard. Altogether,
economic efficiency, due process, and the informal procedural
context (which hampered railroad defense strategies) required a
negligence standard.34
Geiger's response, handwritten by his attorney on three pages,
put the matter in a different light. It maintained that the legislature clearly intended to change the common law negligence rule:
"[A111 the Plaintiff has to prove is the killing[,] the value of prop
erty[,] and ownership which make a prima facie case." Still, the
burden was on the defendant to prove the killing was unavoidable,
reflecting the sound policy that railroads should "Exercise the
utmost care and diligence in the Exercise of their privilege." On a
practical level, the legislature's rule was just common sense. The
company had at least two witnesses-the fireman and the engineer-present at every killing, while the "Plaintiff is at his house
following his daily business." As a result, the plaintiff could never
produce evidence of negligence. Further, according to Geiger,
the plaintiff was never at fault while the railroad always caused the
killing. Surely the legislature had the power to take such matters
into consideration when devising a rule of responsibility."
The court took its time in reaching a decision. Anxiously, the
railroad contacted the court's clerk several times, and on
November 16,1885, Attorney Davis rather oddly requested that "as
soon as the case is decided you will send us a copy of the decision
provided the decision is in favor of the Rail Road Company, which
I have every reason to believe will be the case." He need not have
been concerned. The supreme court's decision began with a dis34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
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cussion of fence laws in territorial Florida, which since 1823 recognized "a right in resident owners of stock for their cattle and
other domestic animals to range and graze on all uninclosed lands
free of change, and without any liability for any damage resulting
from their going upon or grazing on any lands whatsoever not
inclosed by a lawful fence." The coun concluded, "No special
interest is of as much if any more moment to our State, and none
elicited earlier legislative attention than stock raising."36 The
court believed the current livestock liability statute, passed in 18'75,
did not impose any legal duty on livestock ownen to keep their animals off railroad tracks. Despite this background, the court rejected the liability standard articulated by the legislature. It
maintained that liability for livestock killings depended on
whether both parties exercised proper care and that the plaintiff
must prove the defendant's negligence in order to prevail.
The Geiger ruling defended the negligence principle, as
opposed to liability without fault. It defined negligence as "reasonable care under the circumstances" and stated there could be
no recovery if the livestock killing could not have been avoided by
the railroad or was caused by the plaintiffs own negligence. The
court disagreed with Geiger's idea that the burden of disproving
negligence should be on the railroad. It assumed that even
though a railroad might be dangerous, it was nonetheless lawful,
and its lawfulness acted as notice to the livestock owner that the
state would tolerate its dangers. The court considered but eventually rejected a rule that presumed the negligence of a railroad in
livestock cases, a rule common before the Civil War in some southern states. Instead, in "running at ordinary speed, [a railroad] is
doing nothing forbidden, but the very thing required by its organization and required by the commerce of the country."37
Moreover, the court concluded that Florida's statutes did not
~ ~ court dismissed the
impose a presumption of n e g l i g e n ~ e . The
notion that the applicable statute, with its "shall be held liable" language, could possibly impose liability without fault. Citing the
Michiganjurist Thomas Cooley's writings on limitations on legislative powers, it held that such a standard would violate constitu-

36. Ibid.; Savannah, Fhida, and Westm Ry. Co., 21 Fla. at 684.
37. Savannah, Flmiak, and Watern Ry. Co., 21 Fla. at 689-96.

38. Ibid., 21 Fla. at 697-700.
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tional due process: "The legislature cannot thus create judgment,
even as to the single element of the amount of the damage upon
the basis of an ex-parte &davit, nor as to such element [regarding] those of the killing or injury and negligence."39
The court's reference to due process and to Cooley implied a
substantive due process constitutional right to negligence before a
railroad corporation could be held liable. This astonishing conclusion was not really explained. The opinion was not clear
whether it derived the right from the federal constitution, the state
constitution, or both, as no specific provision was referenced.
Nonetheless, the supreme court's citation to Cooley suggests it was
willing to imply a substantive due process right to negligence for a
corporation from the federal Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the
1886 Geiger decision predated the important series of decisions in
the United States Supreme Court between 1887 and 1898 that
established substantive due process as a federal limitation on state
regulation of business. Equally remarkably, the court presumed
without explanation that a corporation as well as a natural person
was entitled to constitutional protections, although the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted to protect the civil rights of former
slaves, not incorporated businesses. That critical issue was not
addressed in the United States Supreme Court until May 1886,
several months after Geiger.40
Analysis of the decision is noteworthy in other ways. It was
issued by a Democratic and ex-Confederate majority. One would
expect such men to have little sympathy for expanding the reach
of the Fourteenth Amendment, a product of Radical Republican
Reconstruction, but apparently their interest in railroad develop
ment overcame any possible doubts. The composition of the court
had changed dramatically in the months preceding the Geiger decision. The new governor, former Confederate general and
Democrat Edward A. Perry, appointed Democrats George G.
McWhorter and George P. Raney to the court in 1885. McWhorter
was a leading figure in the West Florida faction of the party, a close
ally of William D. Chipley, manager of the Louisville & Nashville

39. A Treatise on the ConstitutionalLimitations Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of
the States of the American U n h (Boston, 1874); Savannah, W d a , and W e s h
Ry. Co., 21 Fla. at 698-99.
40. On the corporation as legal person, see Santa Clara County v. Southenz Pacific
RR Go., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
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Railroad, and an eager supporter of railroad construction.
McWhorter even endorsed West Florida's secession from the state
and incorporation into Alabama if the legislature did not subsidize
railroad construction. He eventually resigned from the supreme
court to chair Florida's railroad commission. As for Raney, as an
attorney he represented the state's internal improvement fund,
which was designed to help fund railroad construction. He helped
to negotiate the sale of four million acres of land to Philadelphia
businessman Hamilton Disston, a critical factor in facilitating railroad expansion in the 1880s. After leaving the supreme court,
Raney became counsel for the Seaboard Air Line ~ a i l w a ~ . ~ '
The radical potential of the court's ruling cannot be overemphasized. In the 1873 Shughterhouse Cases, the United States
Supreme Court repudiated a proposition for a substantive due
process right under the federal Constitution similar to that proposed by the railroad in Geiga. That decision was still good law in
early 1886.'~ Moreover, Geiger, although emanating from backwoods Tallahassee, was published just a few months after the more
celebrated case of In re Jacobs, in which the New York Court of
Appeals, the most important state court in the nation, held a labor
regulation invalid under the state's constitution as an arbitrary
deprivation of liberty and property.43 Jacobs is often viewed as a
precursor to the development of the doctrine of substantive due
process under the federal constitution. But Geiger could be viewed
as more sweeping, given that it concerned competing rights to protection of property for accidental harm without the complications
of contract and labor regulations.
Geiger triggered a contest over liability standards between the
court and the legislature. The supreme court had expressed a
philosophical and constitutional preference for negligence. As a
result, Geiger identified the kind of property the supreme court was
most willing to protect. Livestock owners would have an increased
share of the burdens resulting from the new transportation network. As everyone understood, the practical difficulty of proving
railroad negligence in livestock cases-railroad employees were
claims less likely or even
usually the only human witnesse-made
41. Manley et al., The Supreme Couzt ofAhida, 261,266,27583; Williamson, EZorida
Politics in the Gilded Age, 73-80.
42. The SlaugfrCases, 83 U.S.86 (1873).
43. In reJacobs, 98 N.Y.98 (1885).
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impossible. The legislature perceived this and immediately
expressed extreme hostility to Geiger, enacting a law requiring railroads to fence their tracks and making them strictly liable for any
injury "whether [acting] negligently or not" if there was inadequate fencing. The legislature imposed a process by which the
owner of killed livestock would make a direct claim to the company for compensation, allowing the claim to be enforced by attachment and lien against the railroad, and providing that if the
railroad failed to pay the claim and it was necessary for the livestock owner to seek enforcement in court that the court should
award the value of the livestock plus 50 percent interest on the livestock from the date of the initial claim, and attorney's fees. Two
years later, the legislature imposed a presumption of railroad negligence in livestock cases, further overruling Geiger.44
The supreme court also heard property damage cases after
1865 that did not involve goods on carriers or livestock. Most concerned the application of negligence concepts to duties imposed
by contract or on a local government. Post-Civil War bailment disputes, for example, tended to be decided in the context of wellestablished doctrine. In adjudicating liability arising from a horse
bailment in Jackson County, in which a man hired a horse but mistreated it, the supreme court restated the principle formerly
applied to slaves that a bailee is required to exercise "ordinary diligence," which is "such as men of common prudence generally
exercise about their own affair^."'^ In a dispute involving
Jacksonville, a plaintiff had fallen through the Hogans' Creek
Bridge and "his buggy was broken, his harness ruined, and his
horse seriously injured and rendered unfit for . . . use thereafter.''
The court held that an incorporated municipality could be liable
for injuries on its streets and bridges if its charter included a duty
to maintain public ~treets.'~Other property cases addressed the
negligence of an attorney,*' a timber operation that obstructed the

44. Revised Statutes of the State of M a , ss. 2271-76, 2280.
45. West v. Blackshear & Co., 20 Ha. 45'7 ( 1884); McMurray v. Bassett, 18 Fla. 609
(1882) (without the permission of its owner, a mare became pregnant while
being held at the defendant's livery stable).
46. Jacksonville v. Drew, 19 Fla. 106 (1882) (city charged with the control and regulation of its streets and bridges).
47. Young v. Whitmy 18 Fla. 54 (1881) (negligence unsuccessfully used as a
defense to paying attorney's fee).
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Escambia River,48the negligence of a partner in running a business," and a fire set by a railroad.50 The last, against the South
Florida Railroad Company in Orange County, involved a railroad's
attempt to burn woods adjacent to its property. The fire spread
and destroyed a house and several orange trees.
Two other property cases addressed negligence concepts in
special business relationships. In O'Brien v. VaiZZ, decided in 1886,
a man who left a trunk at a St. Johns County hotel-the trunk was
later stolen--claimed the innkeeper was responsible. The court
held that because the man checked out of the hotel and left the
trunk without any compensation to the innkeeper, the hotel was
responsible only if it was grossly negligent. Unfortunately for the
plaintiff, there were no facts to support such a finding.51
In another dispute, the Western Union Telegraph Company
failed to deliver a message in Pensacola sent from Barbados. The
message concerned an agreement to hire a vessel in Barbados that
would come to Pensacola and carry lumber to the United
Kingdom. Thinking the deal was final, the ship sailed to Pensacola
only to discover that, because its accepting telegram had not been
delivered by Western Union, the shipper hired another ship.
There was no doubt that the failure to deliver the message was negligence. Instead, the question was what damages could be allowed:
the mere cost of sending the telegram or the consequential damages flowing from the fact that the message was not delivered.
Despite the potential burden on telegraph companies, and a contrary rule in other jurisdictions, the court held that the sender
could recover damages resulting in the usual course of business
a trial judgfrom the failure to deliver the message. It
ment against Western Union for more than $ 6 0 0 . ~ ~
After the Civil War, property damage cases still made up the
majority of all Florida accident cases. Damages to goods shipped
48. Sullivan v. Jernzgan, 21 Fla. 264 (1885) (defense of claim depended partly on
whether there was a breach of "the care, diligence and skill ordinarily exercised by timber raftsmen on the Escambia river");Simpson &' Co. u. Daniels, 16
Fla. 672 (1878) (Blackwater River in Santa Rosa County obstructed by logs,
other logs damaged).
49. Richardson v. Ross, 14 Fla. 463 ( 1 874).
50. Saussy v. South Fhida R R Co., 22 Fla. 327 (1886) (A verdict for the railroad
was reversed on the grounds that its attorney improperly questioned a witness).
51. OBrien v. Vaill, 22 Fla. 627 (1886).
52. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hyer Bros., 22 Fla. 637 (1886).
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by common carriers, injuries to livestock by railroads, poorly maintained municipal streets, the incompetence of an attorney, a horse
mistreated by a person other than its owner, rivers obstructed by
timber, goods lost in a hotel, a spreading fire, and an undelivered
telegraph message were the factual contexts for applying the law.
With the notable exceptions of the livestock cases, which generated intense debate between the legislature and the supreme court,
and the spreading fire case, all of the claims arose out of failures
in contract performance or the duties of local government. As a
result, accident law concepts in property cases between 1865 and
1886 were predominantly linked to failures in meeting reasonable
expectations in commercial or government relationships.
Despite the continued prominence of property claims, by 1886
there were hints that the greater future of accident law and negligence would be with personal injuries. One variety of this kind of
case involved injuries to railroad passenger^.^^ The only Florida
passenger case before 1887, which generated two appeals in the
1880s, involved an injury to an elderly man riding a Jacksonville
streetcar.54 PlaintB Adolpho Chappell, apparently using a crutch,
claimed that a streetcar driver started the horsedrawn vehicle in a
manner that shook the car and then threw him to its floor before
he could get seated. He claimed damages of $5,000. In the first
appeal, a trial verdict for Chappell was reversed on the ground that
there was no proof of negligence. According to the court, the
mere fact of an accident did not establish negligence by the street
railway, and moreover, the relevant standard was "ordinary care
and prudence." It saw "no proof of such acts or omissions upon
the part of the driver as show a failure to observe such care, precaution and vigilance as the circumstances demanded-in a word,
A new trial was awarded on
no affirmative proof of negligen~e."~~
appeal, but before the second trial, Chappell died. His wife pursued the case and won another verdict in Duval County. Yet, on
appeal the court gave a narrow view of the state's wrongful death

53. An infrequent type of personal injury litigation involved claims against local
government. A rare decision finding liability against a city arose when lawyers
for Jacksonville neglected to file a required bill of exceptions so as to perfect
an appeal;Jacksmvilh v. Lawson, 16 Fla. 321 (1 878) (plaintiff fell into a ditch).
54. JacksonviZb Street Ry. Co. v. Chapgell, 21 Fla. 174 (1885);JacksonviUa Street Ily. Co.
v . Chappell, 22 Fla. 616 (1886).
55. Jacksonville S h t Ry. Co. v. Chappell(1885), 21 Fla. at 183-85.
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statute, which permitted certain legal actions to continue after
one's death, in holding that Chappell's action for personal injury
did not survive under the statute. The statute provided that
"Hereafter all actions for personal injuries shall die with the person, to wit: assault and batteries, slander, false imprisonment and
malicious prosecution, all other actions shall and may be maintained in the name of the representative of the deceased." The
court read the types of claims after "to wit" to not include
Chappell's case.56
The supreme court also confronted a personal injury to a
pedestrian on railroad tracks. Much as in the livestock area, the
legislature had already perceived the potential for this kind of
injury and, in 18'74, required railroads to erect signs and ring bells
at crossings and to not exceed a speed of four miles per hour in
cities.57 The crossing cases were particularly well suited to the
defense of "contributory negligence." This rule provided that any
negligence-or absence of "ordinary caren-by the plaintiff eliminated the liability of the railroad, even if the railroad also acted
without "ordinary care." A particularly dramatic use of contributory negligence was Louisville 03 Nashville RR Co. v . Yniestra, in
which Moses G. Yniestra, walking along the company's tracks in
Pensacola, was killed. This was the only appeal in Florida between
1845 and 1886 involving a claim for negligent personal injury by
someone who had no contractual relationship with the defendant
or when the defendant was not a unit of government.58
Yneistra was walking along track through the company's
switchyard early in the morning when it was mostly dark. The track
was laid on one of Pensacola's public streets. Yneistra had walked
through the switchyard on his way to and from work for about
three years. In a backing maneuver, the train, allegedly ringing its

56. JacksonviUe Street Ry. Co. v. Ch@eU (1886), 22 Fla. at 625,627. The court did
not decide whether a case by the representative of a deceased passenger
based on the contract of carriage could survive. It only held that a claim of
negligence alone could not. The railroad had argued that "allactions"in the
statute meant all actions, and that the list after "towit" was simply an illustration of the actions barred, not a resaiction. Of course, this rendered the reference to "all other actions" meaningless. The supreme court apparently
agreed;JacksmviUe S t W Ry. Co. v. ChaPpeU, Florida Supreme Court Folder
0767, Florida State Archives.
57. Revised Statutes ofthe State o f M d a , s. 2264.
58. LouisuiIle &'Nashville RR Co. v. Yniestm, 21 Fla. 700 (1886).
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bell and traveling at about three to four miles per hour, ran over
Yneistra. Earlier, workers on the train had seen Yneistra on the
track, but there was no light on the back of the train nor was there
any lookout. The only witnesses to the killing were company
employees.59 Judge W. Douglas King instructed an Escambia
County jury on a full range of negligence issues. Was the engine
property equipped? Was the engine run with due care? Did
Yneistra have "plenty of warning"? If the jury believed the railroad
was liable, it should award such damages as the deceased's life was
worth to his wife. The jury found no contributory negligence and
awarded $25,000 to Yneistra's widow, who was left to care for ten
children.60
The supreme court agreed with the lower court ruling that the
company was negligent in not seeing Yniestra walking near the
rear of the train. Yet, citing New York and Pennsylvania law, it concluded that recovery depended on whether the accident was
entirely the fault of the company.61It held that Yniestra was contributorily negligent because he knew of the property's use as a
switching yard, even though the railroad track on which he was
killed was part of a public street. In essence, the justices accepted
the railroad's argument that Yneistra did not need to walk on the
track, even though it was located on a public road, and consequently rejected the argument that Yneistra had a right to walk on
the road and track and that, as a result, he was not negligent.62
Chief Justice Raney, who wrote the opinion, admitted his unease
about the prospect of a negligent railroad having no liability for
killing a person:
[Tlhe operation of the principle of contributory negligence is unjust and inequitable. By the law, as it unquestionably stands, no matter how negligently or with what
amount of care trains are run, if a person injured by one
of them has failed to exercise care on his part, he cannot
recover. As it happens in nearly every instance of collision, if not all, that the person on the track is alone
59. Ibid., 21 Fla. at 723.
60. Yniestra v. LouhwiIle &' Nashville R R Co., File 18847818, Escambia County
Clerk's Office, Pensacola, Fla.; Ynkstra v. Louisville & Nashvik R R Co.,
Florida Supreme Court Folder 0809, Florida State Archives.
61. LouisvilEe &' Nashville R R Co. v. Yneistra, 21 Fla. at 729.
62. Yneistm v. LouisoiIle &NashvCUe R R Co.,Florida Supreme Court Folder O8OS.
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injured or killed, the train receiving no damage, there is
no present incentive of personal safety on the train hands
to use caution, nor a fear of being compelled to make
pecuniary compensation when they can rely upon being
absolved from their admitted negligence by some careless
act of the plaintiff.
Raney endorsed a rule of comparative negligence, which would
apportion damages based on the relative fault of the parties, but
he thought it was up to the legislature to change the law.63
Chappel1 and YnlEstra were the most important personal injury
appeals in Florida between 1845 and 1886. The supreme court did
not decide any employee injury cases during this time, although
such claims became an increasingly important variety of appeal in
other states.64 Because Chappell and Yniestra both lost their
appeals, the only personal injury verdict in favor of an accidentally injured plaintiff upheld by the supreme court between 1845 and
1886 involved a claim againstJacksonville (a place notorious for its
Altogether, the use of
poor roads) for a man's fall into a
negligence to obtain recovery for personal injuries in Florida
before 1886 was extremely rare. None of the normal sources of
such cases in other states-railroad injuries to passengers, railroad
collisions with pedestrians, or injuries to railroad workers-generated many appeals.
Despite the predominance of property cases and the infrequency of personal injury claims between 1865 and 1886, Florida
was clearly on the path to a modern conceptualization of accident
law. Following a national trend, the supreme court tried to
enshrine negligence as the doctrine that would determine liability
when there was no prior relationship between the injured and
injurer, most notably in the livestock and pedestrian cases. The
court relied heavily on the decisions of other states and on legal
writers, freely importing doctrine in concluding that negligence
was the best way to address the problems created by economic
development. Further, it was no accident that almost all of the
63. Louisville & Nashvih RR Co. v. Yneistra, 21 Ela. at 730, 737-38.
64. An indication that injuries happened, however, is Peninsula Ruilmd v. Guy,
22 Ha. 356 (1886), in which the court discussed the ability of railroad company employees to bind the railroad to agreements entered into with physicians for medical services to railroad workers.
65. Jacksonville v. Lawson, 16 Ela. 321 ( 1878).
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court's personal or property damage cases involved some modern
device such as a railroad or telegraph, or took place in one of
Florida's few urban settings. The legislature was also an important
factor in shaping accident law. It realized that a technological
watershed had been reached by the mid-1880s, yet it was much less
willing than the supreme court to view negligence as the proper
means of assessing responsibility for personal and property
injuries, particularly in the absence of a contract or some public
duty. It adopted a spate of laws that touched on liability issues,
especially for railroads. Many of these statutes specifically rejected
the law as developed by the supreme court and gave greater protection to the injured. In 1887, the legislature overruled the contributory negligence doctrine of Yniestra and adopted the
apportionment approach of comparative negligence. It criminalized drunkenness, failure to deliver goods, and gross negligence by
railroad employees. It abolished the fellow servant rule. It permitted actions by the victims of persons killed by the negligence of
others to survive their death, effectively rejecting the ChaHeU decision. Further, in 1887 and 1889, the legislature imposed a fencing
requirement on railroads and higher than ordinary negligence
standards for the killing of livestock. This was a manifest rejection
of the court's decision in Geiger. Finally, a regulatory body to oversee railroad rate and service issues, the Railroad Commission, was
established in 1887.66
Nineteenthcentury Florida's experience with accidents and
their consequences is not just a subject for lawyers or legal historians. The history reveals broad and important characteristics of the
state's political and economic life. From the beginning, accidents
were linked to problems of technology and urbanization. From
the 1850s through the 1880s, the legislature and the supreme
court tried to fashion rules that would allocate risk according to
the evolving values of the decision makers. Florida's experience
with accident law was unique. Its slow economic development pre66. Revised Statutes of the State of Fi!urida, ss. 2271-76, 2280-84, 2342-44, 2346, 269295. The 1887 legislature also passed the firstJim Crow railroad car law; ibid.,
s. 2268. The legislature had adopted a number of safety statutes in 1874, for
example concerning crossings and prohibiting locking the doors of passenger
cars; Digest of the Laws of the State of Florida, 286-89. A discussion of the contest
over the railroad commission is found in William G. Thomas, Lawyeringfor the
Railmad: Business, Law, and Power in the New South (Baton Rouge, La., 1999),
11@12.
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vented the large numbers of cases that were common in other
states. There were few supreme court accident decisions before
the mid-1880s that were not based on a contractual relationship
between the injured and injurer. And property damage cases, not
personal injury cases, dominated litigation into the mid-1880s.
Also important is that the legislature preferred strict liability in
some factual contexts and specific liability standards in others that
tended to increase burdens on injurers, especially railroads. It
modified or rejected key supreme court rulings in order to protect
persons and property other than railroads. In contrast, the
supreme court embraced the negligence standard, with its
requirement of fault. When given the opportunity, the court
imposed a full spectrum of negligence rules and defenses from
other states, even giving those rules a level of constitutional significance in Geiger. By the late 1880s, Florida possessed a robust body
of statutory and court-created rules for accidental property and
personal injury. Above all, the rules showed that industrial
progress had real costs and that Florida's lawmakers sometimes disagreed about who should bear those costs. In fact, the question of
an appropriate allocation of burdens for accidental injury has
proved to be so intractable-and inherently political-that it continued to generate disagreement into the twentieth century and
beyond.
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